In response to U.S. export controls on advanced AI semiconductors to China, a series of incidents have occurred where GPUs and other components are illegally sent to China through companies in third countries and logistics networks. Cases uncovered by the U.S. Department of Justice have revealed methods involving the falsification of purchasers and end-use information.
Background of Continued GPU Smuggling to China and Challenges in U.S. Government Enforcement
This article is a translation. Read the Japanese original
In a case involving the co-founders of Supermicro, with indictments made public in March 2026, there are suspicions that they falsely identified Southeast Asian intermediaries as end-users and sent servers to China via Taiwan and other locations. The purchase amount by these intermediaries is estimated to have reached approximately $2.5 billion between 2024 and 2025, with portions of it being transferred in massive quantities over short periods.
Additionally, in October 2025, the executive of the U.S. company Hao Global pleaded guilty to attempting to illegally export NVIDIA-made H100 and H200 GPUs. In this case, methods such as relabeling GPUs with fictitious company names and declaring them as general computer components were also confirmed.
In response to this smuggling, the Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) of the U.S. Department of Commerce announced in January 2026 a policy to individually review exports of items such as the H200 to China if security conditions are met. On the other hand, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) pointed out in June 2025 that the BIS lacks a long-term staffing plan to handle the increasing workload and faces issues regarding information sharing between agencies.
In the midst of complex international transactions, a major challenge remains whether it is possible to identify the final destination and actual user of equipment and to ensure thorough enforcement of regulations.
Sources
- 中国へのGPU密輸はなぜ続くのか、そしてなぜアメリカ政府は取り締まることができないのか？ （GIGAZINE、2026-10-02）